NP

PP

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| Pt | From POV of Monthol | Location from left |
| NP | Disregard the O-ring problems and recommending the launch of Challenger, endangering the space crew lives | 0/10 |
| P1 | One engineer suggested that joint rotation would render the secondary O-ring useless, but Hardy did not forward the memos Thiokol | 3/10 |
| P2 | By 1985, Thiokol (and marshall) realised the problem and began redesigning the joint | 6/10 |
| SC1 | Calling for halt to shuttle flights until the joints were redesigned | 8/10 |
| PP | Fixing the O-ring problems as soon as the issues were discovered and insist on halting all flights until all problems are fixed | 10/10 |

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| Pt | From POV of NASA | Location from left |
| NP | Ignoring the issues brought up by Thiokol and pressurise Thiokol into recommending the launch and prioritising the pacifying of vice-president Bush over the risks and the lives of the space crew | 0/10 |
| P1 | Nasa Managers disregard of warnings from Thiokol’s engineers about dangers of launching posed by the cold temperatures of that morning and failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors | 1/10 |
| SC1 | NASA considers the risks and comments made by Thiokol engineers and agree to their recommendation of rescheduling the launch to a day with better weather conditions | 6/10 |
| SC1 | Considers the O-ring risks brought up by Thiokol engineers and redesign the O-ring, postponing the flight. | 8/10 |
| PP | Considers and evaluates the risks and considerations brought up by Thiokol engineers and delay the programme to allow time to redesign the new joint system. | 10/10 |